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Early discussions about South Africa’s high 
level of popular unrest focused on ‘service 
delivery protests’, but in recent years the 
broader conception of ‘community protest’ has 
gained currency, and we use it here.1 Whether 
This article reports on the frequency and turmoil of South Africa’s community protests from 2005 to 
2017, which, taken together, have been called a ‘rebellion’. It defines ‘community protest’ as protests 
in which collective demands are raised by a geographically defined and identified ‘community’ that 
frames its demands in support/and or defence of that community. It distinguishes between ‘violence’ 
and ‘disorder’, which has produced a novel three-way categorisation of turmoil, namely ‘orderly’, 
‘disruptive’ and ‘violent’ protests. Drawing on the Centre for Social Change’s archive of media 
reports, the largest database of its kind, and by comparing its data with details gleaned from the 
police’s Incident Registration Information System (an unrivalled source of protest statistics), the article 
reveals a rising trend in frequency of community protests and a tendency towards those protests 
being disorderly, that is, disruptive and/or violent. In the process of advancing this position, the 
authors offer a critique of other attempts to measure the number and turmoil of community protests.
one’s main interest in the phenomenon is with 
social dynamics or with policy, a common 
starting point must be assessment of scale. 
We present evidence for two measures: total 
‘frequency’ of protests, and what may be called 
‘turmoil’. Turmoil is a loose term introduced 
to encourage discussion between analysts 
who utilise a range of concepts with different 
definitions (such as riots, unrest incidents and 
violent protests). When calculating turmoil, we 
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distinguish between orderly, disruptive and 
violent protests, and our conclusion is that 
community protests have occurred with growing 
frequency and more disruption and violence 
(or ‘disorder’ for short). We nuance this view, 
though, by proposing that from a high point in 
2012, the total number of these protests and 
the number that was disorderly has flattened 
off somewhat.
Our assessment is based mainly on media 
reports of protests archived by the University of 
Johannesburg’s (UJ) Centre for Social Change 
(CSC).2 We refer to these as media-reported 
community protests (MRCPs). Robustness 
of our calculations can be gauged through 
contrast with other accounts, of which there 
are two kinds. First, we look at estimates 
based on South African Police Service (SAPS) 
data, captured by its Incident Registration 
Information System (IRIS). We provided a review 
of IRIS and its statistics in South African Crime 
Quarterly 58 (2016), and that article should 
be regarded as a companion to the present 
piece.3 Second, there are evaluations provided 
by three other monitors utilising media data. 
These are the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data Project (ACLED), the Civic Protests 
Barometer (CPB), which is based at the 
University of the Western Cape, and Municipal 
IQ (MunIQ). Our engagement with these other 
organisations’ appraisals necessarily involves 
a critique and clarification of their concepts 
and methodologies. This contributes a further 
dimension to the article. 
We begin with concepts, then deliberate on 
methodologies, and, finally, consider estimates 
of protest frequency and extent of turmoil.
Community protests: 
conceptualisation
Our research, a form of protest event analysis 
(PEA), is quantitative, and requires definitions 
that can be operationalised in a consistent 
fashion. The first key concept is ‘protest’. 
Drawing on international and local literature 
and our own experiences and objectives, 
we defined this as ‘a popular mobilisation in 
support of a collective grievance’.4 ‘Grievance’ 
conveys a sense of being wronged, without 
this necessarily being clearly specified. 
‘Popular’ means ‘of the people’ rather than 
‘well supported’, and implies action by people 
who are relatively marginal. Our theorisation 
consciously excluded battles between taxi 
associations, gangs, and the like; that is, 
between forces with similar status.5
We use the term ‘community’ in reference to 
protests related to a geographically identified 
area.6 This should not be taken to imply that 
‘communities’ are homogeneous, and we are 
acutely aware that sometimes only a certain 
section of a community participates in a protest 
(often the unemployed). A ‘community protest’ 
is defined as a protest in which collective 
demands are raised by a geographically 
defined and identified ‘community’ that frames 
its demands in support and/or defence of 
that community. Community protests are 
distinguished from those with other foci, which 
we have termed ‘labour-related’, ‘crime-related’ 
and so forth. The notion of ‘community protest’ 
is broader than ‘service delivery protest’. The 
latter term, frequently used by journalists in 
South Africa, tends to conceal the complexity 
of issues that communities raise, which often 
include criticisms of South Africa’s democracy. 
Furthermore, the SAPS, the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and the South African 
Local Government Association (SALGA) are 
now using the term ‘community protest’.7
Our approach differs to that of other 
databases. Table 1 encapsulates aspects of 
various measurements of community protests.8 
It contrasts our database of MRCPs with 
(a) IRIS, (b) our IRIS-derived police-recorded 
community protests (PRCPs), (c) ACLED, 
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(d) CPB and (e) MunIQ. It summarises 
methodological as well as conceptual 
differences, both of which have a significant 
impact on frequencies. The variation evident in 
the table is not accidental but is underpinned 
by divergent reasons for counting protests; that 
is, different perspectives (and, implicitly, different 
theories of protest).  
The SAPS’s IRIS is an aid to public order 
policing (POP), and POP capture and input of 
the data. It records ‘crowd incidents’ – including 
social and sporting occasions – rather than 
Monitor
Unit of 
analysis
Scope Extent Perspective Source(s) Turmoil
Date 
range
South 
African 
Police 
Service 
(SAPS)
Crowd 
incident 
(peaceful 
and unrest)
All protests 
and other 
crowd 
incidents
Any size, 
on a 
specified 
day
Public order 
policing
Incident 
Registration 
Information 
System 
(IRIS)
Unrest/
peaceful
1997–2013
Centre 
for Social 
Change 
(PRCPs)
Community 
protest
Local 
community 
action, not 
limited to 
municipal 
demands
Any size, 
on a 
specified 
day
Popular 
mobilisation, 
counter-
hegemonic, 
academic
Incident 
Registration 
Information 
System 
(IRIS)
Violent/
disruptive/
orderly
1997–2013
Centre 
for Social 
Change 
(MRCPs)
Community 
protest
Local 
community 
action, not 
limited to 
municipal 
demands
Any size, 
on a 
specified 
day
Popular 
mobilisation, 
counter-
hegemonic, 
academic
Media Violent/
disruptive/
orderly
2005–
present
Armed 
Conflict 
Location 
and Event 
Data 
(ACLED) 
project
Community 
protest 
(derived 
from 
riots and 
protests)
Local 
community 
action, not 
limited to 
municipal 
demands
Any size, 
on a 
specified 
day
Political 
violence, 
normative, 
comparative, 
academic
Media Riots/
protest
1997–
present
Civic 
Protests 
Barometer 
(CPB)
Civic 
protest
Targets 
municipality 
(could be 
proxy for 
national 
government)
Any size, 
with 
open-
ended 
temporal 
framing
Institutional 
development, 
normative, 
academic
Media Violent/
peaceful
2007–2015
Municipal 
IQ (MunIQ)
Service 
delivery 
protest
Limited 
to local 
government’s 
service 
delivery 
mandate
Major, 
with 
open-
ended 
temporal 
framing
Administrative 
efficiency, 
normative, 
policy
Media Violent/
peaceful
2004–
present
Table 1: Summary of indicators for South Africa’s community protests
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protests.9 The CSC was fortunate in gaining 
access to information about 156 230 incidents 
recorded by IRIS for the years 1997 to 2013. 
IRIS has a number of fields for data capture, 
but for protest analysis the most important are 
open-ended notes provided for each incident 
(which vary in length from a few words to more 
than a thousand). Analysis of a large random 
sample of these notes revealed that, using our 
definitions (above), about 43% of all crowd 
incidents were ‘protests’, and that of these, 
about 22% were ‘community protests’.10 We 
call the latter PRCPs (as distinct from MRCPs). 
PRCPs are a far more comprehensive record 
of community protests than MRCPs (see 
below). However, our MRCPs are valuable for 
three reasons. First, they provide data that 
extends beyond 2013. Second, they act as a 
check on IRIS, which has blind spots, notably 
the years 2007–2009 when reliability was 
severely impaired by a marked reduction in the 
number of public order police. Third, though 
not considered further in this article, MRCPs 
are derived from the CSC’s database, which 
includes a different range of information about 
protests than included on IRIS. 
In contrast to the SAPS perspective, we have 
collected media data and interpreted police 
data with a view to understanding the social 
dynamics of protest. Ultimately, we want 
answers to questions like: Why do people 
protest? What is the impact of protest on 
political change? By way of further contrast, the 
other media monitors have normative concerns; 
they see protests as evidence of something 
wrong and are asking questions about what 
needs to be fixed. They are not necessarily 
hostile to protesters. The CPB is concerned 
with institutional development and MunIQ with 
administrative efficiency. ACLED’s attention to 
protests is secondary to its primary interest 
in armed conflict and political crisis, which 
provides a context for considering interventions 
of various kinds. The significance of these 
distinctions will be more apparent when we turn 
to ‘turmoil’. For now, two points are relevant. First, 
overlapping perspectives and similar sources 
make it possible to compare frequencies. Second, 
assessing concepts and judging outcomes requires 
a sympathetic understanding of perspectives, none 
of which is, a priori, better than others. 
ACLED divides conflict events into ‘event types’. 
Two of these interest us, ‘riots’ and ‘protests’, and 
ACLED combines these into a single category of 
‘riots/protests’. According to its definition, these 
are ‘demonstrations against a (typically) political 
entity, such as a government institution, although 
this may also include some demonstrations 
against businesses or other private institutions.’ It 
adds: ‘The event is coded as involving protesters 
when it is non-violent; and as involving rioters if 
the demonstrators employ violence.’11 ACLED 
captures data in ‘real time’ and its files are 
regularly updated and publicly available. Event 
records are accompanied by open-ended notes, 
which, although less detailed than those provided 
by the SAPS, assist our research in two significant 
ways.12 First, read alongside definitions for other 
‘event types’, one can see that ACLED’s ‘riots/
protests’ approximate to the CSC definition 
of ‘protests’. Second, they provide sufficient 
information for us to distinguish which ‘riots/
protests’ qualify as ‘community protests’. So, as 
with SAPS data, ACLED data can be compared 
directly with our own, and differences are reduced 
to sources and methodology. 
CPB and MunIQ, however, do not detail the 
protests they record (nor do we at this stage), so 
we must work with their own units of analysis, 
both of which centre on local government. The 
CPB is interested in ‘civic protest’, which, it says, 
refers to ‘conflict which is public and commonly 
oriented towards local government or, through 
local government, towards the state as a whole’. 
It adds: ‘Our definition excludes forms of protest 
linked to private interests, such as wage disputes 
and contractual failures, or protests that form part 
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of wider civil disobedience movements.’13 In 
practice, its ‘civic protests’ are similar to our 
‘community protests’, and sometimes it uses 
‘community protest’ as an alternative to ‘civic 
protest’, clarifying that it includes ‘any complaint 
or issue cited by protesters’.14 MunIQ, however, 
has a much narrower orientation, one limited 
to protests ‘staged against municipalities’ 
and solely in relation to their ‘service delivery 
mandate’.15 This tallies with MunIQ’s own remit 
as a local government intelligence specialist.
For CPB and MunIQ, a protest could last 
many days and it would still be counted as 
one protest. The SAPS, ACLED and we follow 
standard practice in protest event analysis 
and treat a protest as a daily event.16 So, for 
us, a protest that lasts three days is recorded 
as three events (assuming it is reported on 
each of those days). With most of our media 
sources appearing daily and details of action 
sometimes changing (e.g. size, location, level 
of disorder, demands, etc.) this makes practical 
sense. Daily counting is also logical for police 
who must report an incident at the end of a 
shift (at the latest). MunIQ only includes ‘major’ 
protests, which it defines as constituting more 
than 100 people.17 Along with ACLED and CPB, 
we refrain from imposing a limit, which, in our 
view, is problematic, because few media reports 
specify numbers. ACLED’s data goes back to 
1997, MunIQ’s to 2003, ours to 2005 (though 
we have some reports for 2004), and CPB’s 
to 2007. 
Turmoil in community protests: 
conceptualisation
Broadly speaking, there are two ways of 
conceptualising turmoil in community protests 
(and, indeed, protests in general). The first is 
to merely differentiate between ‘peaceful’ and 
‘violent’. We reject this simple dichotomy, and 
in 2014 adopted an approach that separates 
‘order’ from ‘disorder’ as well as ‘peaceful’ 
from ‘violent’. All violent protests are disorderly, 
but not all disorderly protests are violent; some 
are disruptive but peaceful. This leaves us with 
a three-way categorisation of protests: orderly, 
disruptive, and violent.18 By implication, our 
definitions of ‘peaceful’ and ‘violent’ are different 
from those deployed by others. For us, violent 
protests are those with evidence of damage 
to property of others and/or injury to persons. 
Orderly protests are tolerated by the authorities 
and often negotiated in advance. They include 
pickets, marches and public meetings. Disruptive 
protests are identified by tactics such as 
blocking a road, commonly achieved by placing 
rocks and/or burning tyres. In recent years, our 
conceptualisation has gained traction among 
other researchers.19
Concern to introduce ‘order’ into an 
understanding of protest turmoil relates to our 
social dynamics perspective, and is underpinned 
by historical considerations. Disruption – also 
known as civil disobedience – has been an 
integral part of movements associated with 
progressive social change, including the British 
suffragettes, Mahatma Gandhi’s participation in 
the struggle for Indian independence, the United 
States’ Civil Rights Movement, and the African 
National Congress’s Defiance Campaign. It often 
crosses a legal boundary, but does so without 
contravening widely held moral sensibilities 
opposed to harm and destruction. A disruptive 
protest challenges the established order, but 
does so without transgressing the South African 
Constitution.20 Treating barricades as ‘violent’ 
delegitimises the intentions of the protesters and 
misconstrues the dynamics of protest. A single 
peaceful/violent binary also has the danger of 
reinforcing moralism. As Bohler-Muller et al. put 
it: ‘[S]uch subdivisions are reductive, biasing 
audiences against certain social movements, and 
presenting a false dichotomy between “good” and 
“bad” protestors.’21
Arguably, the law, though ambiguous, includes 
its own distinction between violence and order. 
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Lt. Col. Vernon Day of the SAPS POP’s policy, 
standards and research department explained: 
‘Failure to give notice [of a protest], resulting in 
a spontaneous incident, would not [necessarily 
require intervention] even if in contravention of 
[the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA)] 205 of 
1993.’22 Here he echoes injunctions contained 
in the SAPS National Instruction on Public Order 
Policing (2014).23 These instructions were an 
attempt to reconcile the 1996 Constitution, 
which includes a right to ‘unarmed and peaceful 
assembly’, with the pre-Constitution RGA, 
which makes provision for police intervention 
in protests that are neither violent nor threaten 
injury or destruction of property, but involve 
disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic. That 
is, there is a distinction between ‘disruption’ 
(a word used in the Act) and violence.24
Our own division is essentially sociological and 
pragmatic, rather than legal, and we regard 
disruptive protest as peaceful unless there 
is evidence of actual violence. In our view, 
social scientists’ primary responsibility is to 
understand phenomena rather than allow a 
priori judgments to cloud conceptualisations and 
methodologies. Disruption may be frustrating for 
non-participants and it might be a precursor to 
violent conflict, but, on its own, it does not result 
in injuries or damage the property of others. Our 
approach might be regarded as ‘bottom-up’, 
and it has been conditioned by our qualitative 
research, which includes interviews and 
interactions with police as well as protesters.25 
In a quantitative study using a large national 
sample, Bohler-Muller et al. found that people 
had little difficulty comprehending a three-way 
distinction similar to our own.26
Regarding other datasets, IRIS distinguishes 
between crowd (unrest) and crowd (peaceful) 
incidents. In addition to the common error of 
assuming a ‘crowd’ is a protest (see discussion 
above), there is often a second error (made, 
notably, by the SAPS itself), one of assuming 
that ‘unrest’ equates to violence by protesters. 
In fact, for IRIS and public order police, ‘unrest’ 
is defined as ‘police intervention’, which could 
include arrests as well as, for instance, use of 
tear gas.27 This is logical and relatively easy to 
operationalise. The definition does not indicate 
violence by protesters (even if the police are 
responding to violence or threat of violence), 
and, indeed, the incident may not involve any 
‘violence’ in the sense we have used it. As the 
name implies, public order police are primarily 
concerned with preserving order (as they see it), 
rather than responding to actual violence. For 
consistency, in analysing IRIS data, we applied 
our definition of violence to what we read in 
its ‘notes’.
ACLED provides little detail and no justification 
in distinguishing between ‘rioters’ and 
‘protesters’, simply stating: ‘[R]ioters are by 
definition violent, and may engage in a wide 
variety of violence, including in the form of 
property destruction … or violence against 
unarmed individuals.’28 While we have problems 
with this particular use of the loaded term 
‘rioter’, ACLED’s definition of violence is close to 
our own, and, if applied literally, should include 
a disruptive demonstration as a ‘protest’ rather 
than a ‘riot’.
The CPB’s definition does the reverse; it treats 
disruptive protests (most of them anyway) as 
violent action. Asserting that violent protests 
are those ‘where some or all of the participants 
have engaged in actions that create a clear and 
imminent threat of, or actually result in, harm to 
persons or damage to property’, it clarifies that 
this includes cases ‘where roads are barricaded 
and the passage of non-participants is 
impeded’.29 We have seen from large numbers 
of IRIS and media reports that describe 
disruption without mention of damage or injury, 
that it is wrong to assume that a barricade 
is a ‘clear and imminent threat of harm’. The 
CPB’s definition introduces an unnecessary 
element of subjectivity, making it less robust.30 
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Moreover, we know from qualitative research 
that police sometimes initiate violence, although 
not necessarily by intention.31 The CPB does 
in fact recognise this, commenting: ‘[L]abelling 
a protest as violent in nature fails to distinguish 
between those protests that were violent initially 
from those that became violent after aggressive 
responses by police.’32
Reinforcing concern about police interventions, 
MunIQ recently commented: ‘[P]olicing of 
protests appears to add another layer of 
violence, further destabilising the already 
vulnerable relationship between communities 
and authority figures.’33 Unfortunately, to 
the best of our knowledge, MunIQ has not 
published its definition of ‘violence’.
Operationally, our ‘violent protests’ are those 
where there is any evidence of violence. 
In practice, media reports mostly provide 
insufficient detail to know whether it was 
protesters or the police who initiated violence. 
Many merely refer to a ‘violent protest’. Also, 
from qualitative research, we know it is quite 
common for police to fire rubber bullets into 
a peaceful gathering and for protesters to 
respond by throwing stones and, perhaps later, 
by setting fire to a building. A reporter might 
be unaware of the initial police action or might 
not regard it as violent. Our approach has two 
implications. First, one should not make a moral 
judgment about protesters on grounds that their 
protest has been recorded as violent.34 Second, 
we are unlikely to undercount violent protests. 
Similarly, if there is any evidence of disorder we 
record the protest as either disruptive or violent, 
and, thus, are unlikely to exaggerate the number 
of orderly protests.35 
Having clarified our conceptual approach, 
we now present an account of sources and 
methodology. Following that, we summarise 
findings on the frequency of, first, all 
community protests, and, then, ‘disruptive’ 
and ‘violent’ protests.  
Community protests: sources 
and methods
We begin by discussing the CSC database in 
some detail. This is the first published account 
of our methodology. The CSC database draws 
from three sources. The first of these is the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation’s (SABC) 
news research. Early on, this had the distinct 
advantage of including information from reporters 
and informants in the field, most of which was 
never aired, giving us protests not reported 
elsewhere, including in small towns. In recent 
years, many reports have been taken from other 
published sources.36
The second source, SA Media, is a news clipping 
service that archives South African newspapers – 
it includes nearly all dailies and some others too, 
and provides full reports rather than summaries. 
Started in 1978, it was originally hosted by the 
University of the Free State, but was closed 
in 2014 as an austerity measure, without 
alternative arrangements being made. Following 
a campaign, it was revived in modified form by 
Sabinet. Unfortunately, Sabinet has not recovered 
cuttings from the first five months of 2015.37 
In 2012, SA Media covered 49 newspapers;38 
under Sabinet it takes in 39.39 Discontinued 
newspapers were peripheral and made little 
difference to the number of protests reported. In 
actual fact, in 2016 and 2017 the proportion of 
our reports deriving from SA Media was slightly 
higher than in previous years. It is possible that 
improved technology and new protocols led 
to the selection of more articles, but we think 
the addition of New Age was more significant, 
because it carries a relatively high proportion of 
provincial news and hence more protests.40 In 
our calculation of frequencies for 2015 and the 
end of 2014, the period affected by disruption 
to SA Media, we have added extra protests, 
based on estimates, using experience of what SA 
Media contributes to the total. Fortunately, most 
protests are recorded in more than one source.
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We chose SA Media articles using keywords, 
and we settled on the term ‘protest’ (having 
experimented with synonyms that failed to yield 
additional reports).41 One limitation of SA Media 
– indeed, of all our sources – is that it does 
not include African-language newspapers. 
Among these, the only daily paper is the isiZulu 
Isolezwe, which we checked for a month, 
only to discover it did not contain additional 
protests. Use of Lexis Nexis, another news 
clipping database, was trialled, but SA Media 
was more comprehensive. 
Our third contributor is the South African Local 
Government Briefing (SALGB), an independent 
publication that monitors many aspects of 
local government, and is published a minimum 
of 12 times a year.42 It is especially valuable 
because it systematically gathers and précises 
online reports (as distinct from printed reports). 
SALGB’s collection started in 2007, but a survey 
of online archives for protests before this date 
revealed very few extra protests. 
Between 2005 and 2007 the SABC provided the 
majority of protest reports; from 2007 to 2015, 
SALGB contributed the most reports; and, 
since 2016, more reports have come from SA 
Media than from other sources. No one source 
dominates our data collection. Remember, too, 
that protests are usually reported by more than 
one source.
On receiving reports, our first task is to exclude 
anything that does not meet the criteria of a 
‘community protest’. This filter mainly affects SA 
Media sources, which include foreign protests 
and opinion pieces. Second, we archive reports, 
both physically and electronically. This includes 
the process of ‘de-duplication’, undertaken 
manually, which ensures that multiple reports 
of the same protest are included as only one 
event.43 We simultaneously collate the reports, 
thus maximising knowledge of each protest. 
Third, we capture data on Microsoft Access. 
Thirty fields are available but ‘missing data’ is 
common because reports often do not include 
required information. Fourth, data is copied into 
Microsoft Excel and, from there, to SPSS, which 
we use for analysis. Student assistants code 
reports, and everything is checked by Carin 
Runciman, one of our senior team members.44 In 
the early stages, the whole team discussed difficult 
cases to ensure consistency.
The media only report a minority of protests 
and one should give thought to possible biases. 
Fortunately, because we are able to compare 
our MRCPs with our PRCPs we have gained 
valuable insights in this regard. To the best of our 
knowledge (and that of other experts in the field) 
there has never been a release of police data 
anywhere in the world on the scale of the IRIS 
records we received, and what we offer here is 
probably a more precise account of media bias 
than found elsewhere. Even so, we should insert 
two cautionary notes. First, we are beginning to 
find MRCPs that do not appear in IRIS. Overall, 
they are a small minority, but we have not 
completed our search and are unable to be more 
specific at this stage.45 Second, because IRIS is 
dependent on input of data by POP, its record of 
protests is probably skewed by the location of 
POP units and the role of public order policing 
(though all police are supposed to report crowd 
incidents to locally-based IRIS controllers). This 
is likely to have two implications: under-reporting 
from small towns and rural areas distant from POP 
units (clearly a problem in 2007–2009), and under-
reporting of orderly protests that do not require 
POP intervention. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, comparing our 
MRCPs with PRCPs for the period 2005–2013, 
it is possible to highlight four biases in media 
recording of protests. First, we estimate that the 
media has reported less than a quarter of the 
number of protests recorded by the police.46 It is 
therefore a mistake to take frequencies of MRCPs 
– or frequencies of any media-reported protests 
– as an accurate reflection of the total number of 
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community protests. Second, a lower proportion 
of PRCPs than MRCPs is ‘disorderly’. The 
media clearly give an exaggerated impression of 
the extent of violence and disruption associated 
with protests.47 We return to this below. Third, 
the size of protests, as reported in the media, 
tends to be greater than the size of protests as 
recorded in IRIS. That is, it is particularly smaller 
protests that go unreported in the media.48 
Fourth, a substantially higher proportion of 
MRCPs than PRCPs is recorded as occurring 
in the two provinces where most media offices 
are located, namely Gauteng and the Western 
Cape.49 If we are aware of these biases, we can 
make good use of media data to develop an 
approximation of trends in numbers of protests.
How does our recording of media-reported 
protests compare with that of others working 
in the same field? ACLED is an international 
operation, based at Sussex University, which 
monitors conflict across Africa and in many 
Asian countries. It is well funded with a large 
staff, operates rigorous checking, and utilises a 
wide range of sources, which include print and 
electronic news reports, government and civil 
society publications, and some direct reporting 
to ACLED staff.50 Its publicly available event 
records include mention of a specific source for 
each protest, which is a distinct advantage.51 
ACLED started ‘real time’ or ‘active’ coding in 
2012, and then undertook ‘back coding’ for 
previous years. According to Clionadh Raleigh, 
ACLED’s director: ‘Active coding produces 
many more events.’52 
The CPB has twice improved its methodology. 
From 2007 until 2011 it used Lexis Nexis and 
SALGB. From 2012 it shifted to use of social 
media and online ‘news aggregators’, such as 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s social protest 
observatory. Since 2016 it has processed data 
in semi-automated fashion, and this ‘allows for 
additional digital resources to be leveraged and 
ensure ever more comprehensive coverage’.53 
The CPB searches using the keywords ‘protest’ 
and ‘service delivery’. Frustratingly, MunIQ does 
not reveal its sources of information.
In evaluating these methodologies, the main 
evidence must be what they produce in practice. 
We turn now to findings on frequencies.
Community protests: frequency
Figure 1 (on page 36) allows us to compare the 
CSC’s MRCPs against its PRCPs, the closest 
approximation of all protests that occurred. 
Trends are similar: generally upwards across 
the period, with peaks in 2012. Without under-
recording of PRCPs in 2007–2009, the shapes of 
the two lines would be even more alike (though 
the 2009 peak in PRCPs would be more distinct). 
Our estimated total number of recorded PRCPs 
for 2005–2013 is just under 8 700, and we have 
2 054 MRCPs for the same period. That is, 
PRCPs outnumbered MRCPs by about 4.2 to 1 
for the whole period, rising to 4.3 when the 2007–
2009 years are excluded from the calculation.
Table 2 shows the total number of 
community protests (MRCPs), 2005–2017, on 
the CSC database.
Year MRCPs
2005 106
2006   50
2007 169
2008 164
2009 314
2010 252
2011 208
2012 471
2013 322
2014 375 (377)
2015 343 (363)
2016 377
2017 375
Source: CSC database. 
Table 2: MRCPs 2005–2017 (2014 and   
 2015 include actual records 
 and estimates)54
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Figure 2: Protests recorded by Centre for Social Change (2005–2017), 
 Municipal IQ (2005–2016), ACLED (community protests only) (2005–2017) and   
 Community Protests Barometer (2005–2015)56
Sources: CSC database, Municipal IQ, ACLED and CPB.
Figure 1: MRCPs compared with estimated PRCPs, 2005–2013 (with trend lines)55
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Figure 2 compares our MRCPs (the CSC 
line) with data from ACLED (our calculation of 
community protests), the CPB (civic protests) 
and MunIQ (major service delivery protests). 
MunIQ has recorded considerably fewer 
protests than the CSC, which is unsurprising, 
given its limited focus on service delivery, its 
exclusion of ‘minor’ protests and its method of 
counting all protests as a single event whatever 
their duration. However, the shape of the CSC 
and MunIQ lines is similar, which probably 
reflects that a high proportion of community 
protests include service delivery issues. It may 
also indicate that MunIQ, like the CSC, has 
been consistent with sources.
Unlike the other three lines, the one that 
represents the CPB is rather flat, with almost 
no upward trend. The shapes of all graphs 
2006
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are similar until 2010, but it is noticeable that, 
whereas the others show a marked increase 
in the number of protests in 2012, the CPB 
records a decline. Given that the CPB changed 
its methodology in 2012, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that its new sources were less 
generous than the old ones. This, in turn, 
reduces the value of the CPB graph as a gauge 
of the trend in frequency of community protests. 
The profile of the ACLED graph is the complete 
opposite. It shows a sudden rise in the number 
of protests between 2011 and 2012 that is 
sharper than indicated by the CSC, MunIQ 
and, indeed, IRIS, and from 2013 onwards 
ACLED recorded more protests than the CSC. 
From 2005–2013 our methodology produced 
similar trends to those derived from IRIS, and 
our methodology and sources have been 
consistent, so we are content that our graph 
provides a reasonable guide to the pattern of 
protest frequency. Given that we have applied 
our own definition of ‘community protest’ to 
ACLED data, it is reasonable to assume that 
the sudden increase in numbers in 2012 is 
associated with commencement of ‘active 
coding’ as explained by Raleigh.57 However, 
ACLED is now using a wider range of sources 
than the CSC, and its figures currently come 
closer to the number of protests occurring 
(though, as seen from the police data, it is still a 
long way short of the actual frequency). 
The CSC has two archives of information for 
South Africa’s community protests: a large 
sample distilled from IRIS for 1997–2013, and a 
collection of media reports for 2005–2017. As 
a record of protests, the IRIS data is peerless. 
Comparing our MRCPs with the IRIS protests 
(referred to as PRCPs) it was found that, from 
2005–2013, PRCPs exceeded MRCPs by more 
than 4 to 1, but the two indicators provided a 
similar pattern of rise and fall in frequency of 
events. The MRCPs were then compared with 
data from ACLED, CPB and MunIQ. Given 
the similarity in pattern between PRCPs and 
MRCPs and the CSC’s source consistency, 
the CSC’s MRCPs are probably a more reliable 
guide to the pattern of community protests from 
2005 to 2017 than the other three databases. 
They show a peak in 2012, when 471 MRCPs 
were recorded, and then, from 2014, a levelling 
off with about 370 protests per year. We cannot 
explain the MunIQ and CPB peaks in 2014 or 
the ACLED peak in 2015, though these may 
have been related to definitions and sources. 
However, except for the CPB, we all show a 
much-increased level of protest across the 
period as a whole. 
Turmoil in community protests: scale
We now turn to the scale of turmoil. Figure 3 
shows the number of our MRCPs that were, 
respectively, orderly, disruptive and violent. For 
the period as a whole, there has been a marked 
decline in the proportion that was orderly, with a 
peak of 50% in 2006 and nadir of 17% in 2016, 
but from 2012 the decline was slighter, and in 
2017 there was a small increase in the number 
and proportion of MRCPs that was orderly. The 
upward trends of disruptive and violent protests 
were similar, but marginally steeper for violent 
protests. Once again, we remind the reader that 
a ‘violent protest’ was a protest that revealed 
some level of violence, whether initiated by the 
police or protesters. 
Figure 4, which includes PRCPs, gives credence 
to the picture obtained by analysis of MRCPs. 
It compares disorderly MRCPs with disorderly 
PRCPs for 2005–2013, and shows remarkable 
similarity in the shape of the two graphs.
We can now compare the protests we regard 
as ‘violent’ with ACLED’s ‘riots’, which, by its 
definition, are regarded as violent. We have 
accomplished this in Figure 5. The ACLED 
data suggests that a higher proportion of all 
community protests was violent (riots) than 
indicated in the CSC (MRCP) data. However, 
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the pattern is remarkably similar, with a levelling 
off in the proportion of all community protests 
that was violent from 2010. Differences can be 
accounted for in terms of definitions, selection 
of sources, and our reading of ACLED notes. 
The significance of these graphs is that while, 
in recent years, there has been an increase 
in the proportion of protests we regarded as 
disorderly (i.e. disruptive as well as violent), 
the proportion that was violent has remained 
approximately constant, at about 43% using 
CSR data and definitions.59 
With the CPB and MunIQ the comparison 
must be a different one, because here we must 
contrast our figures for disorderly protests 
with theirs for violent ones (see discussion of 
concepts for explanation). CPB data shows that 
between 2013 and 2016, 90% of civic protests 
were violent and that in the first seven months of 
2016 the figure reached 95%.60 With MunIQ the 
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Figure 3: MRCPs that were orderly, disruptive and violent, 2005–2017
Source: CSC database.
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pattern was similar. They estimate that between 
2004 and 2016, about 75% of service delivery 
protests were ‘violent’, with this ranging from a 
low of 67% in 2011 to a high of 86% in 2016.62 
Our figures for disorderly community protests as 
a proportion of all protests for these two years 
were, respectively, 69% and 82%.
So, our assessment is that, drawing on media 
data, while there has been an upwards trend in 
the number of disorderly community protests 
since 2006 (slighter from 2013) the proportion of 
all community protests that was actually violent 
has been relatively stable since 2010. Moreover, 
a similar conclusion can be reached if we base 
the interpretation on a careful reading of data 
from the other agencies. 
Conclusion
This article has provided a critical review of 
the main sources of community protest data 
for South Africa, thus enabling comparisons 
between them. Description and discussion of 
the CSC’s concepts, protocols and sources 
for enumerating MRCPs suggest it provides 
a strong guide for determining the pattern of 
community protests in the country. The quality 
of this data is underlined by comparison with 
SAPS data for 2005–2013 and by detailed 
consideration of concepts and sources used 
by ACLED, CPB and MunIQ for 2005–2017. 
We noted that MunIQ, while measuring only 
major service delivery protests, produced a 
similar shaped frequency graph to ourselves, 
perhaps because it was also consistent with 
its sources of information and because most 
community protests include demands about 
service delivery. However, we are concerned 
about MunIQ’s lack of transparency. ACLED is 
now collecting more media reports of protests 
than we are and, if it is consistent with sources, 
could develop into a better indicator of the 
pattern of community protests in South Africa. 
Moreover, ACLED monitors a wider spectrum 
of events, giving it the potential to compare (a) 
community protests with other kinds of protest 
in South Africa, and (b) South African protest 
with protests in other countries.
In considering turmoil associated with 
community protests, we introduced a distinction 
between violence and disorder, providing a 
three-way categorisation of protests as orderly 
or disruptive or violent. We argue that this way 
Figure 5: Comparison of MRCPs and ACLED community protests regarded as violent,   
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Source: CSC database and ACLED analysis by authors.
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of understanding turmoil is more sympathetic 
to protesters and to the history of protest, 
better captures the changing dynamics of 
protests, and consistently applies a definition 
of ‘violence’. Further, it is alive to the police’s 
concern with both preventing disorder and 
policing violence.
Evidence revealed in the CSC’s database 
showed there were about 3 550 MRCPs 
between 2005 and 2017. Assuming PRCPs 
outnumbered MRCPs by about 4 to 1, a 
ratio we explain, it would appear that more 
than 14 200 community protests took place 
between 2005 and 2017. In practice, IRIS 
did not manage to record all protests, thus 
the actual figure would have been higher, 
perhaps by about 25%. Moreover, MRCPs 
have occurred with increased frequency, rising 
from 50 in 2006 to a peak of 471 in 2012, then 
settling down to figures exceeding 320 for the 
next five years.
Further, whether one applies our three-way 
distinction, or the simple binary used by the 
SAPS, ACLED, CPB and MunIQ, there has 
been growing turmoil in community protests. 
Our own data shows a rise in community 
protests that were disorderly; from 50% in 
2006 to 83% in 2016. However, we nuance this 
view using CSC and ACLED data to propose 
that the proportion of community protests that 
was actually violent has been relatively stable 
since 2010. Media reporting exaggerates the 
extent to which protests are disorderly, but the 
generally upward trend cannot be doubted and 
is confirmed by sources other than our own.
Since 2006, there has been considerable 
growth in the number and turmoil of South 
Africa’s community protests. In 2010, 
Alexander described these protests as a 
‘rebellion’, a term taken up by other writers.63 If 
it was right to draw attention to the scale of the 
revolt then, it is even more appropriate today.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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